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Framing International Rights with a
Janusism Edge-Foreign Policy and Class
Actions-Legal Institutions as Soft Power
Harvey Rishikof'

Mark Twain is reported to have quipped, "It is admirable to
do good. It is also admirable to tell others to do good-and a lot
less trouble."'
INTRODUCTION

It is hard to review the intersection of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 ("Rule 23"), the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA") 2,
and the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA")T and not call to
mind Twain's aphorism. The principles animating these multiple
judicial doctrines are not only noble but also admirable. Yet the
overall effect, given the current state of international law and the
recent international positions taken by the United States, is to
create a form of International Judicial Janusism, a two-faced vision of international rights and responsibilities.4
The argument of this Article is that the issues raised by the
23/ATCA/TVPA model are of such weight that they have to be
understood in the context of international relations and international law. The 23/ATCA/TVPA model poses a serious challenge
to the traditional paradigm of the international system. In a way
though, the traditional paradigm of the international system,
based on state actors, has been under attack from at least two
Visiting Distinguished Professor, National War College, Washington, DC, 20022003; Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law, Bristol, RI. I would like
to give special thanks to Trudi Rishikof for her assistance; Peter Hall for his extensive and
thoughtful comments; Peter Gourvevitch for his support; and the editors of The University
of Chicago Legal Forum for their editorial and research assistance. The views expressed in
this Article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the
National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Judith Goldstein, et al, Response to Finnemore and Toope, 55 Int Org 3,.759 (2001).
2 See Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 USC § 1350 (2000) (supporting jurisdiction over torts
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States).
Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 USC § 1350 (2000).
Janus was the ancient Roman god of polarities, whose head had two opposing
faces---one smiling and one frowning.
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fronts for some time: non-governmental organizations ("NGOs")
and a new, potentially muscular set of international institutions,
such at the International Criminal Court ("ICC"). Each is worth
at least a brief look.
NGOs 5 have become a force to be reckoned with within the
international system and have brought issues to the conventional
international agenda with a vengeance. The well-known story of
the recent international agreement on the use of land mines is a
prime example of how a private organization, with little governmental support, can martial a winning world coalition in the international arena.' Terrorist groups, as NGOs, have called into
question both domestic and international structures since they
involve non-state actors with multiple nationalities (including US
citizens and aliens), loose affiliations or networks involving
criminal law, armed conflict conventions, and national security
violations.7
The story of the creation of the ICC is viewed by the United
Nations as a triumphant struggle for a new international legal
institution that places one more building block in the foundation
of a world court of justice and liberty. America's refusal to join
either international regime has challenged the legitimacy of these
agreements and the role of international law.
What makes the 23/ATCA/TVPA model so fascinating is that
it cuts across traditional paradigms of civil procedure, rights law,
plaintiff classes, plaintiff lawyer entrepreneurs, international
law, international institutions, judicial authority, state power,
and American foreign policy. The broad span of issues results in
unanticipated outcomes and political alliances based on the pursuit of international human rights causes of action in federal
court.

' NGOs can be domestic or international. Their decision making processes are not
controlled by any particular government, although they may receive funds from state
governments.
' See Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II to the 1980 Convention as amended
on 3 May 1996), available online at <http://www.icrc.org> (visited Oct 13, 2003).
' See Harvey Rishikof, A New Court for Terrorism, NY Times A15 (June 8, 2002)
(arguing for a federal court dedicated to resolving these issues).
8 I am restricting the discussion to the federal courts although, as is pointed out by
Professor Beth Van Schaack, similar class actions are more than possible under state class
action law. Beth Van Schaack, Unfulfilled Promise: The Human Rights Class Action, 2003
U Chi Legal F 279. This to my mind only further complicates an already complicated
situation.
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This argument is divided into four sections. Part I is a brief
description of international law and the strands of thought that
inform the "Realist versus Idealist" debate. Introduced are the
four basic ideologies or strands that have competed to define the
appropriate approach to international law: the exceptionalists,
the legalists, the human rightists, and the pragmatists. As part of
the discussion, each strand is placed in the context of the
23/ATCA/TVPA model. Part II analyzes a number of the key concepts that inform the class action debate and their relevance to
the concept of the 23/ATCAfTVPA model. Part III is an analysis
of the 23/ATCA/TVPA model as articulated by some proponents of
its efficacy. Finally, the Conclusion explores why the
23/ATCA/TVPA model has proven to be so controversial in the
rights area and advocates a new approach to the issues.

I. INTERNATIONAL LAW IS MORE THAN REALISTS VERSUS
IDEALISTS

International law is a body of customs, principles, rules, conventions, and treaties promulgated to create binding legal obligations for sovereign states and international actors.9 State sovereignty forms the basis of our international system. State foreign
policy is based on, and constrained by, the intertwining of damestic and international law. Traditionally, our foreign policy has
been conducted by the executive branch in consultation with the
legislative branch. But the modern world system is not an open
playing field. In fact the modern world system is characterized by
a set of dominant structural constraints: decentralization, selfhelp, and asymmetry. Decentralization has led to a highly competitive international system with each state jockeying to enhance its interests. The system, despite the emergence of a number of international institutions, has retained a "self-help" component that relies on military force.10 And finally, the international system has been, and remains, hierarchical, in the sense

' See Christopher J. Joyner, International Law, 2 Encyclopedia of American Foreign
Policy 259 (Scribner's 2d ed 2001) (presenting an in-depth definition of international law).
" This is most clearly demonstrated in recent times by the stated willingness of the
United States to undertake an invasion of Iraq by itself if necessary. See NationalSecurity
Strategy of the United States, Chapter V, Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our
Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction, Sept 2002, available online at
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html> (visited Oct 9, 2003) (discussing the need for
.preemption").

250

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2003:

that some states are more equal than others and exercise greater
power-economically, politically, and militarily.
As the twenty-first century begins, the United States stands
astride the international system as a colossus. American values
stand for free markets, human rights, and democracy. America is
viewed by its friends and foes as a hyper-power, a hegemon, and
a modern empire.11 A long-time strain of American culture, the
strain of isolationism, has clearly retreated in the face of the nation's responsibilities and capacities. From its inception, America
has stood alone. The first president, George Washington, in his
Farewell Address in 1796 advised against foreign entanglements
and "interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe."' 2
This approach was the luxury of a new, small, emerging country.
Today's America cannot ignore the affairs of other countries,
and it cannot avoid international law as if it does not play a role
in the affairs of the world. The post-World War II international
system-the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO"), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund ("IMF")-involves organizations in which the United
States has been a chief architect. Although in recent history these
institutions have come under severe strain, with the fall of the
Berlin Wall, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the creation of
the World Trade Organization, international law continues to be
a force for the legitimization of state action.
Often when discussing American foreign policy, the debate is
framed as "Realists versus Idealists." As first understood by Max
Weber, what makes the international state system different from
individual state power is that there is no legitimate monopolization of the use of coercive force.1" Realists and Idealists both grapple with the Weberian problem of the lack of international authority. Realists focus on power as the dominant feature of international relations. For Realists, the defining feature of international politics is that, unlike domestic politics where state power
is constrained, there are few restraints in the international sys-

" This is growing into an extensive literature. See, for example, Michael Ignatieff,
American Empire (Get Used to It), NY Times Magazine 22 (Jan 5, 2003); Michael Mandelbaum, The Inadequacy of American Power, 81 Foreign Affairs 5 (2002).
" George Washington, Farewell Address, available online at
<http:www.yale.edulawweb/avalonlwashing.htm> (visited Jan 31, 2003).
" Max Weber, 1 Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology 58, 82
(Berkeley 1978) (Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds).
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tem. 4 When the state loses the legitimate monopolization of force,
civil war or revolution ensues. A state in such a situation is in a
state of anarchy until order is restored. Due to the anarchic nature of the international system, states need power to prevail. In
the end, some form of a balance of power is the only guarantor of
stability. But stability for Realists is an elusive goal because each
state actor is constantly striving for advantage. The modern Realists of today stand for unilateral action in the international system." As Mark R. Amstutz noted, Realism "is distinguished not
by amorality or immorality but by a morality of a different sort,
one that differentiates political ethics from personal ethics and
judges actions in terms of consequences." 6 One is held accountable for acts of commission and omission. For this strand of
thought, the Munich Compromise by the allies in the early 1930's
allowed fascist Germany to garner power.
Idealists, on the other hand, emphasize the ideal of constraints on the exercise of power and the importance of world cooperation." The Idealist solution for the Weberian problem of no
legitimate monopolization of force is the establishment of international institutions to promote civilizing, internationally agreed
upon norms. This is not to say that Idealists are opposed to the
use of force. Force is contemplated by Idealists, as long as the
force is employed in a cooperative manner sanctioned by international norms and institutions. 8 Idealists believe in the power of
big ideas to shape the world and make it a better place. 9 Recently, Michael Mandelbaum has argued that reliance on the ideals of peace, democracy, liberty, and free markets are key reasons
for the current dominance of American power." Modern-Idealists,
the heirs of the Wilsonian League of Nations, are multilateralists
who believe in the power of many, not one, or at least a small coalition of the willing who are not part of a larger, institutionallysanctioned action.2 '

" See, Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and

Peace 5 (Random House 5th ed 1978).
"

Mark R. Amstutz, International Ethics: Concepts, Theories and Cases in Global

Politics 50-58 (Rowan & Littlefield 1999).
Id at 53.
Id at 58-63.
18 Id.

Amstutz, InternationalEthics 58-63 (cited in note 15).
Michael Mandelbaum, The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy and
Free Markets in the Twenty-first Century (Public Affairs 2002).
" See NationalSecurity Strategy (cited in note 10).
'8
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But the "Realist versus Idealist" debate does not fully capture the strands of thought that compose the foundations of the
American approach to international law. Given the international
competing structure that the Weberian problem identified, four
basic ideologies or strands have competed to define the appropriate approach that should dominate our foreign policy with relation to international law: the exceptionalists, the legalists, the
human rightists, and the pragmatists. By teasing out these
strands, one can establish the impulses that have animated the
debates over human rights class actions and the 23/ATCA/TVPA
model.22
A. Exceptionalist Foreign Policy
Exceptionalist foreign policy is based on the assumption that
the United States is different from, and superior to, all other
states in the international system; thus our foreign policy should
advance our national interests. International law, when it is a
fetter to our view or interest, should be ignored. We have a unilateral right to act since we have a unilateral imperative based on
our values. An early manifestation of this approach is reflected in
the Monroe Doctrine whereby we announced to the world that our
sphere of influence was clear and paramount." Our motives are
based on "Americanism," a combination of noble and honorable
aspirations and motives that are unique unto themselves. The
exceptionalist basis is the justification for our action and stands
above the concept of international law. Needless to say, this view
is reinforced by the capacity to act and project our will with force.
Therefore our laws, our approach to rights, our views of remedies
can be, and may have to be, projected on the world. Because the
world cannot be counted on to bring evildoers to justice, but we
can, we therefore should. To carry out this mandate is to teach
the world the American-the correct-way to enforce the law.
Under this conception, the 23/ATCA/TVPA model as energized by
the theory of class action makes perfect sense and should be understood as an appropriate projection of American exceptionalism
of American law to the international system.
' These strands are identified and analyzed in Joyner, Encyclopedia 259-81 (cited in
note 9). The discussion is also informed by a memo drafted by Hanni Cordes [On file with
U Chi Legal F].
' The Monroe Doctrine of 1825 declared that the Western Hemisphere was closed to
colonization and aggressive actions by European states. See Ernest R. May, The Making of
the Monroe Doctrine (Harvard 1975).
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B. International Legalist Foreign Policy
The legalist foreign policy bases its legitimacy in international law. A number of existing, nascent, and proposed international judicial bodies (for example, the International Court of
Justice and the European Court of Human Rights); quasi-judicial
bodies (for example, the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights); dispute settlement tribunals (for example, the International Labor Organization Administrative Tribunal); permanent
arbitral tribunals (for example, the Permanent Court of Arbitration); claims and compensation bodies (for example, the EritreaEthiopia Claims Commission); inspection panels (for example, the
Asian Development Bank Inspection Policy); and regional integration agreements (for example, the Court of Justice of the
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) constitute a
patchwork of conventions and treaties that comprise international law.24 The United Nations and its component units constitute only part of the world forum for international law. A guiding
principle of these forums is that the respective governments voluntarily commit to, and follow, the agreements. This legal tradition is particularly important for the use of military force in the
international arena.
Various international agreements and bodies govern the use
of force in the international arena. Although the right of "selfdefense" is a recognized international principle under Article 51
of the United Nations Charter, the concepts of casus belli (an act
regarded as a reason for war) or jus ad bellum (the law for war)
or jus in bello (the law in war) enforce restraint.2 5 Moreover, under Article 51, although the Charter does not impair the inherent
right of self-defense in an armed attack, that right exists "until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security."" The Geneva Conventions
make naked self-interest an unacceptable form of behavior and
constitute the basis of international humanitarian law. Since
America has been a fundamental pillar of the U.N. and other bodies, its support and recognition of the system's logic are essential
for its maintenance. The 23/ATCA/TVPA model asks when it is
For a full chart of the myriad of bodies, see The Projecton InternationalCourts and
Tribunals,available online at <http:www.pict-pcti.org> (visited Nov 8, 2003).
' The Charter of the United Nations, Article 51, available online at
<http:www.un.org/aboutuncharter/chapter7.htm> (visited Nov 8, 2003).
' Id.
2
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appropriate to use international fora, and when domestic fora are
to be preferred. When does the use of domestic courts undermine
or negate the efficacy of international tribunals? When America
chooses not to ratify a treaty, protocol, or convention, but its traditional allies and friends do, what is the effect on international
legalism?
C. Rights-Based Foreign Policy
The third major strand of America's approach to international law derives from its particular brand of liberalism. The
Constitution and the Bill of Rights privilege individual rights
over government control (although this is not the only way the
individual is protected, since the checks and balances of the separation of powers and federalism also constrain the central power).
Rights politics play a special role in American consciousness and,
in recent decades, have played an increasingly prominent role in
the nation's approach to international politics. Some trace this
tenet to Article III of the Constitution, which specifically described federal jurisdiction as "arising under the Constitution...
and. . . the Laws of the United States," which included international law claims based on treaty and custom.27 Needless to say,
other theorists argue that customary international law does not
have the status of federal law until authorized by the appropriate
political authority.28
International agreements are always scrutinized by powerful
interests, whether governmental or private, to ensure that individual rights are protected. But American liberalism also has a
deep commitment to self-determination. The tension of liberalism
to define how far the duties of human rights stretch beyond U.S.
borders has been a constant source of debate and strain within
the foreign policy community.2 9
During the Cold War, the rights of the citizens of our allies
were often sacrificed if our allies' governments were significantly
anti-Communist. ° This Realist approach to rights often stood at
"7 Ugo Mattei and Jeffery S. Lena, United States JurisdictionOver Conflicts Arising
Outside of the US: Some Hegemonic Implications, 1 Global Jurist Topics 3 (2001), quoting
US Const Art III.
Curtis A. Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as Federal
Common Law, 110 Harv L Rev 815 (1997).
' See Stanley Hoffmann, Duties Beyond Borders (Syracuse 1981) (discussing the pros
and cons of human rights policies).
' Id.
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odds with the liberal promotion of universal rights. The advantage of the 23/ATCA/TVPA model is that it places human rights
front and center, as a key component of American foreign policy
and international law. As stipulated by the ATCA and codified at
28 USC § 1350, "The district court shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."" When
combined with class action doctrine, this produces a powerful tool
that has generated claims of "legal imperialism" by some critics.32
D. Pragmatic Foreign Policy
Pragmatism is the final strand of thought addressed in this
Article. Rather than a grand design or integrated philosophical
approach, pragmatism deals with issues or questions on an ad
hoc basis. Pragmatism focuses on meeting short-term goals that
deal with each issue on its own merits. Pragmatists tend to focus
more on integrating national and international interests without
overly emphasizing consistency over time, adopting a "that was
then, this is now" reasoning. Sometimes this is a reflection of a
change in political administrations or a recalibration of the costs
and benefits in each case. Decisions regarding military intervention are often subject to this form of scrutiny. Each time a situation arises the case has to be made for why the nation is putting
its soldiers in harm's way. This is analogous to the classic "caseby-case" approach of the common law legal process. The common
law method provides a perfect example of how a pragmatic approach, loosely guided by general principles, can produce a variety of results until the Supreme Court speaks.3 3 This is a form of
instrumentalism-the science of muddling through-that can be
guided by a philosophy of minimalism. The concept of taking one
case at a time with a general overarching principle emerging
from the individual cases is an approach that creates reform as
minimalism in the legal realm. In the international world, however, the types and forms of reaction to the pragmatic case-bycase approach are more multi-faceted and more potentially
deadly, (such as the counter reaction to the idea of "preemption"
as the promotion of proliferation).
31

28 USC § 1350 (2000).

Mattei and Lena, United States Jurisdiction2 (cited in note 27).
3 Cass Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court
(Harvard 2001).
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In the context of the 23/ATCA/TVPA model, judicial techniques that allow for pragmatism over jurisdiction are embodied
in the concepts of "minimum contacts," "political question," or
"forum non conveniens."34 These techniques are used to clear
dockets and remove cases. In some instances pragmatism results
in the case being filed in another forum or the cause of action not
going forward. Of course, the other form of pragmatic judicial restraint is the denial of the certification of a class under Rule 23.
Each of these strands of internationalist thought has implications
for judicial involvement in human rights litigation. To fully integrate the power that the judiciary has in the 23/ATCA/TVPA
model, however, we must tie it to the general theory of class actions.
II. CLASS ACTION THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A. What Does Class Action Theory Have To Do With It?
Many of the questions raised by the 23/ATCA/TVPA model
stem from the underlying issues recognized by the contemporary
debates over class actions in the domestic context. The very nature of the private action, or a "class action," that creates a group
seeking a general remedy cuts to the core of our individual tort
compensation system of persons pursing individual remedies in
order to make them whole.
Richard Epstein, in his article analyzing the efficacy of the
class action as a mode of procedure, raises a fundamental question for all class actions: who holds the cause of action for damages to the person, for losses of property, or for breaches of contracts?35 The tension that the class action procedure raises for
Epstein results from the balancing of two imperatives: the desire
for personal control of one's own claim and the need for coordination of separate claims.36 In essence the question forces us to decide when it makes sense to relinquish the traditional logic of the
purpose of a lawsuit in order to maximize the desired good of the
individual plaintiff.37
Mattei and Lena, United States Jurisdiction(cited in note 27).
Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: The Need for a Hard Second Look, 4 Civil

Justice Report, at 2, Manhattan Institute, Center for Legal Policy (2002), available online
at <www.manhattan-institute.orglcjr04.pdf> (visited Oct 13, 2003).
" Id at 1.
37

Id.
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In answering this question, Epstein is led to the insight that,
where the fungible interests of all the group members are the
closest, class actions make a great deal of sense. 8 This situation
arises when three conditions are met: (1) the number of individuals similarly situated with respect to a common defendant becomes very large; (2) the loss sustained by each party is relatively
small; and (3) the administrative costs of an individual suit turn
out to be quite high." Given this approach to class actions, he
concludes that the procedural approach that would best allow for
the joint and separate pursuit of interests is permissive joinder
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 ("Rule 20"). 40 Rule 20
allows for permissive joinder of cases when the cause of action
arises "out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. " '
Why then, given the fact we have permissive joinder, do we
need class actions as a procedure? The problem is that there is
"permissive joinder failure." 2 There are situations where there
should be joinder but there is not, due to holdouts, coordination
problems between all of the parties, indivisible remedies that
generate "free rider" problems, and a logic of collective action that
precludes a plaintiff from stepping forward because the administrative costs are too high in comparison to the reward. The solution: the class action-because class action procedure can overcome these barriers. Interestingly, in framing this analysis, Epstein's example is a shareholder suit, since the members all hold
the same shares in the same company. 3 Therefore, the interests
are not only fungible, or typical, as required under Rule 23, 4" but
also identical and parallel. 5 Moreover, the remedy is equally
shared, based on the shareholders' investment. Under these
shared shareholder conditions, there is no "opt-out" problem because the relief ultimately serves the efficiency of the corporation
and its shareholders. Finally, mandatory inclusion is logical since
the alternative is to receive nothing.
Given the Epstein argument for class actions, all that is left
are questions that promote fairness on the issue of representaId at 5-6.
Epstein, ClassActions at 4 (cited in note 35).
'0 Id at 5-6.
" FRCP 20.
4' Epstein, ClassActions at 5 (cited
in note 35).
41 Id at 5-6.
See FRCP 23(a).
Epstein, Class Actions (cited in note 35).
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tion. How does one police or choose the class representatives? A
race to the courthouse rule, "first in time-first in right" rule, or
auctions that limit the contingent fee of the attorneys for a fixed
amount, or a shareholder vote based on an election for representation are suggested. Yet, there is still a nagging question-what
happens to the representations of those who lose and do not have
the legal representative of their choice? The "grin and bear it"
approach of those who lose their choice undermines the fundamental right to control one's case, or class action, but this may be
a fair price to pay for the ultimate benefit. Moreover, there is a
continuing legal problem of res judicata on subsequent litigation,
appropriate attorney fees, and the use of class action procedure to
shape substantive law. But these concerns are manageable with
some appropriate tinkering. For Epstein it is the "modern class
action" where things begin to become unhinged.
For Epstein, the "modern class action" begins to lose its attraction as one weakens the binding elements of fungibility of
shares, which then undermines the indivisible nature of the relief
and parallel nature of the individual claims.46 Modern class actions have extended the procedure to new harms, and the new
harms are not analogous to the shareholder situation.47 The res,
or the thing, is different due to the nature of the harm and the
different state laws with different substantive law. This problem
can arise whether the harm is a "single event," such as an airplane crash (incident concentrated in time, location, and injury),
or a "dispersed event," such as harm from asbestos or pharmaceutical products (different time horizons with future plaintiffs,
events in different places, different grades of harm).48
These characteristics raise issues over which much ink has
been spilt, including in the pages of the 2003 edition of The University of Chicago Legal Forum. Should a plaintiff have a right to
"opt-out," as recognized under Rule 23(b)(3), or should a plaintiff
Mattei and Lena, United States Jurisdictionat 12 (cited in note 27).
4' Some examples of potential class action harms or mass torts under Rule 23(b)(1),
(b)(2), or (b)(3) where the number of estimated plaintiffs is high and the harm is an ongoing event are: tobacco (50,000,000 plaintiffs); breast implants (440,000 plaintiffs); asbestos
(300,000-700,000 plaintiffs); Dalkon Shield (300,000 plaintiffs); Norplant (30,000-50,000
plaintiffs); Radiation-HRE (23,000 plaintiffs); Radiation fallout (21,192 plaintiffs); Agent
Orange (15,000 plaintiffs); Heart valves (12,000 plaintiffs). See Report of the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules and the Working Group on Mass Torts to the Chief Justice of
the United States and to the Judicial Conference of the United States on Mass Tort Litigation, Appendix D: Individual Characteristics of Mass Torts Case Congregations, 7 (Feb
15, 1999). This report also provides cases where class certification was used or denied.
48 See id at 4-5.
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be "conscripted" and be forced under a mandatory scheme to be a
part of the class as stipulated by the Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2)
limited fund class actions? For the opt-out class there is no res
judicata, but there is control. For the defendant, once an opt-out
class manifests, the calculations of cost-benefit analysis change,
and, for obvious reasons, there will not be a one-time universal
settlement.
The opt-out approach satisfies the prime directive of allowing
the plaintiff to own the lawsuit. The problem arises when a class
is certified and the opt-out is in force, the defendant has a twofront war, and the fairness and efficiency arguments begin to
weaken for Epstein. One therefore has two possible approaches to
the dilemma-make all class actions mandatory or make it very
difficult to certify classes. Epstein leans to the latter option because of the risk that, in the end, all differences in plaintiffs'
cases will be "bled out of the equation" and choice of forum power
will, over time, tilt the substantive law in favor of plaintiffs.4 9 But
others, such as David Rosenberg, lean to the former. Rosenberg
would criticize the current "second" opt-out opportunity under
Rule 23(b)(3) precisely because it weakens the ability of those
who depend on class actions for protection and general deterrence, and he would advocate for limited opt-out options under
most circumstances. 50
As part of his parade of horribles, Rosenberg refers to Basic v
M and
Levinson"
the acceptance by the Court of the general "fraudon-the-market" theory.52 Such a general theory allows a weakening of the requirement for individual plaintiffs to show specific
reliance on the specific information for their actions and allows
for a class to be certified on defendant action alone, in this case
injecting false information into the market place, in essence shifting the burden from individual plaintiff to defendant once an act
takes place.
This shifting of the burden and unnatural policing of the defendant and the market is perfectly exhibited in the tobacco comEpstein, ClassActions 14-15 (cited in note 35).
David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out To Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: Cost
Without Benefit, 2003 U Chi Legal F 19; David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class
Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 Harv L Rev 831 (2002); David
Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Tort: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62
Ind L J 561 (1987) ("This is the school of collective justice."). See also David L. Shapiro,
Class Actions: The ClassAs Partyand Client, 73 Notre Dame L Rev 913 (1998).
485 US 224 (1988).
5' Id at 225.
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pany litigation. Once the "assumption-of-the-risk" defense by the
tobacco companies became a winning strategy against individual
plaintiffs, the critical moment came when the plaintiffs' bar
switched strategies from individual smoker cases and brought
individual actions on behalf of Medicaid programs. For Epstein
these are "disguised" or "concealed" class actions that work a
class action alchemy by expanding the scope of liability by the
process of amalgamation. 3 The approach was successful because
the courts became confused over the doctrines of subrogation and
assignment. Medicaid program plaintiffs should have been properly understood as standing in the shoes of individual smokers
and not as independent entities.54 Under this view, the rights of
individual smokers were assigned under subrogation and subject
to the same affirmative defense of "assumption-of-the-risk" as the
individual smokers were subject to." The assumption of the risk
defense for each individual fell by the wayside through amalgamation since individual warning was not sufficient for the tort
harming the Medicaid programs.56 Epstein's view that all of the
plaintiffs were subject to the assumption of the risk defense
raises the key question as to what the ultimate end of the class
action is-the individual right or something else?
If it is something else, then what is it? Rosenberg has articulated what it is in his approach to mandatory class participation-a regulatory deterrence insurance regime." For Epstein,
the class action is attractive only under certain circumstances,
when it conforms to derivative suits for corporations and voluntary association. The procedure is valuable since it is corrective of
"permissive joinder failure," and the other potential defects of the
procedure are tolerable due to the benefit. For other mass torts,
however-Agent Orange, tobacco, international chemical acts,
international human rights (criminal and civil)-Epstein begins
to waver.
Yet these mass torts, for Rosenberg, cry out for class actions.
Rosenberg also recognizes the "permissive joinder failure" and
sees the class action procedure as the way to arm those denied
access to the courts with a powerful weapon. 8 Not only has the
Epstein, Class Actions 15-16 (cited in note 35).
Id.
6'Id.
Id.
Rosenberg, 2003 U Chi Legal F at 23-24 (cited in note 50).
Id at 67-68.

247]

CURRENT ISSUES IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION

261

market failed in these cases, but so has the government. The procedure allows for mass private causes of action where there has
been public legislative failure. Since the legislators have allowed
the defendants to commit harm without regulation or compensation by insurers, and the political context, short of class actions,
would allow for a liability-free behavior, class actions are the answer. In fact, since the remedy is for the larger group-class,
market, structure, and regime-he is led to the conclusion that
the certification should be mandatory and opt-outs restricted. His
normative theory is that individuals should be allowed to utilize
the mode of adjudication that the individual seeks in order to
maximize his welfare. 9 For the system and the individual defendant, this will be the optimal deterrence, and to sacrifice this
general good for individual welfare is, in fact, inefficient.6 ° In a
thoughtful twist of logic, Rosenberg turns the Law and Economics
approach on itself to defend the procedure that has been attacked
on equity grounds by the Law and Economics school. Law is full
of irony.
This is a private regulatory system for the common good. The
mandatory class approach more rationally allocates judicial resources, is more cost effective for plaintiffs, and levels the playing
field when powerful defendants are involved. The challenges for
Rosenberg are to police the class representation and the counsel
fee structure, and to promote rational, fair rules for distribution
issues. In fact, the very characteristics that lead Epstein to be
ambivalent to class actions---cases that involve daunting questions of science, causality, technology, business and government
finance, and organization-are recognized as problematic by
Rosenberg.6 1 But for Rosenberg, since both the government and
market have failed, lawmaking by courts is the best we can do.62
It is this concept of private lawmaking for the public good
that makes Martin H. Redish uncomfortable.63 To his mind, class
actions have done nothing less than undermine "the foundational
precepts of American democracy." 4 For Redish, class actions have
transformed the essence of governing substantive law and are no
longer a mere procedural device to facilitate the enforcement of
Id.

Id at 25-26.
Rosenberg, 2003 U Chi Legal F 19 (cited in note 50).
Id.
Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the
Intersection ofPrivateLitigation and Public Goals, 2003 U Chi Legal F 71.
62

Id at 73.
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existing substantive law. In fact, they have metamorphosized
from a private victim's compensatory damage suit into a vehicle
for private attorneys, with large financial incentives to discover
violations of corporate behavior.65 Rather than compensating violations of private substantial rights, in reality a few attorneys,
like "bounty hunters" in the guise of serving the public interest,
file "faux" suits based on policies embodied in the statutes. 66
Given the opt-out option of Rule 23(b)(3), most class members are
not informed and are given coupon rather than cash settlements.
The only true beneficiary of the suit is the class attorney. Thus,
these suits fundamentally are not compensatory damage suits,
and these "disguised bounty hunter actions" are not authorized
by the underlying substantive law that is being enforced.67
Ultimately, these are not legitimate suits of "private attorneys general" since the state has chosen not to prosecute, and the
rewards are kept by the public attorneys.68 Whether ideological
and based on injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2) or motivated by
self-interest, the suit would not be possible if the harm were de
minimis. The logic of the private compensatory model would dictate it should not go forward-there is no permissive joinder failure; the system is working.69 To believe otherwise is to introduce
the idea of parens patrie on behalf of individual plaintiffs in law
suits.7 ° It means the plaintiffs who are not going forward are suffering from a variant of false consciousness. As for class actions
being an enforcement regime on behalf of the collective community, we already have a private compensatory remedial regime.
This procedure is on behalf of a "nonexistent" class with the only
beneficiary being the third-party entrepreneur lawyer/bountyhunter. This procedure is particularly pernicious because it undermines the tenets of democracy covertly: traditional theories of
representation and accountability are secretly subverted.71 This is
a counter-majoritarian example of judicial lawmaking-a reme-

67

70
7

Id at 74.
Id at 75-77.
Redish, 2003 U Chi Legal F at 81 (cited in note 63).
Id at 90-91.
Id at 100-01.
Id at 101-02.
Here he is part of the school of John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability:

Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in RepresentativeLitigation, 100 Colum L Rev 370
(2000). Moreover, Redish acknowledges that the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 USC § 78u-4 (2000), might suggest that Congress has given tacit approval of this class action regime but reasons that it identified part of the problem but
failed to solve it. Redish, 2003 U Chi Legal F at 74 n 9 (cited in note 63).
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dial regime neither fully understood by the public nor consented
to.
Given that a complete overhaul of class action is not practical, Redish recommends the following fixes: for Rule 23(b)(1)
mandatory actions the Congress should make the determination
where it is appropriate; for Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive relief actions
where the right may be held by the class and not by the individual, such as civil rights class actions, the Advisory Committee on
the Rules should review the issue; and finally, for Rule 23(b)(3)
actions, given the problems at the start and at the end, Redish
suggests replacing the opt-out with a more specific opt-in.2
On the remedy side, he contends that although a judge has
the power to police the settlement under Rule 23(e)'s fairness
prong, he is not required to.73 Given this laxity, Redish suggests
that the judge should be mandated to scrutinize the dispute to
ensure that individual plaintiffs will receive "meaningful compensation."74 In this vein, he further recommends the restriction
of coupon settlements so that plaintiffs' lawyers cannot inflate
the value of the settlement for fee purposes and transform the
case into a faux qui tam action.75
Based on this discussion, then, who is right? As one can see
from the issues raised by the theory of the class action, debate
rages over whether (1) the procedure undermines democratic control of pubic goods, such as the regulation of corporate behavior,
or (2) whether this is a proper private mechanism for compensation of harmed individuals who, but for the mechanism, would go
uncompensated. For Rosenberg, the true value of the class action
is its ability to have private parties-given the problems of collective action-enforce public rules on the system of bad actors .
The underlying compensation is less of an issue. Redish, on the
other hand, condemns the process as a usurpation and distortion
of public power by private attorneys for unanticipated selfish private gain. Epstein stands somewhere in the middle-ambivalent.
The attraction of the procedure for Epstein is how, under specific
conditions (pure shareholder suits), it overcomes a procedural
failure of permissive joinder and allows for increased market effiT

72

Redish, 2003 U Chi Legal F at 130-32 (cited in note 63).

13

Id at 132.

'
'5

'

Id at 133.
Id at 134-35.
Rosenberg, 2003 U Chi Legal F 19 (cited in note 50).
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ciency by supporting causes of action that should, but would not,
go forward, but do benefit the corporation.
B. What Is The Relation Of The Domestic Class Action Debate
To The International Context?7
How does the primarily domestic debate on class actions relate to the international context? Richard Epstein has introduced
some criteria for appropriate class actions: individuals must hold
the same/similar causes for action, there must be large numbers
of plaintiffs, the loss of each plaintiff must be small, and the administrative costs of each individual suit must be high. "Opt-out"
is unavailable in these cases, since allowing opt-out options will
weaken the efficacy of the suit. Under these clear criteria a
strong case can be made for international class actions, assuming
the cases meet the multi-part test.
In fact, these foreign plaintiffs have even less capacity to
seek redress than average Americans would have. From the victims' perspective, lack of other fora for redress underscores the
need for the cause of action. Analytically, the foreign corporate
shareholder cases raise this issue in particular.
For Martin Redish the essential problem is that class actions
can become a substitute for substantive law (for example, legislated law) and a treasure trove for bounty hunters. The threat of
class actions displacing legislation and the undermining of the
democratic process is the Redish domestic nightmare. In the international realm, however, there are few international legislators and arguably, despite the efforts of the U.N., few effective
enforcement regimes. So, there is nothing to be displaced-but
there are national legislatures. On the one hand, one can argue
that the 23/ATCA/TVPA model is a statement by the Congress to
create this new American-based regime of international jurisdiction. But, on the other hand, Redish's distaste and critique of the
domestic "bounty hunters" may now be transformed into a critique of the "international lawyer bounty hunters." The model
therefore may be an improper use of a private legal mechanism to
rewrite international norms and mores of self-determination and
undermine respective state accountability.
For some, international bounty hunters may be a small price
to pay for the redress of human rights abuses, and until an effec" The following section is based on comments and ideas stemming from Peter Hall
and Ryan Sandrock.
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tive international regime is created, the 23/ATCA/TVPA model
may be the most legitimate and democratic regime around. Conversely, for other internationalists it is the U.N. or regional alliances such as the European Community that should set the jurisdiction for international class actions and, until they do, the
well-intentioned international bounty hunters should be curbed.
If one takes the David Rosenberg position for the proposition
that the essential goal of the class action is not to redress individuals for individualized harm but to punish or deter wrongdoers, then the 23/ATCAJTVPA model may be the most appropriate
approach for the international system.
This is the grand public policy perspective arguing that the
point of class action suits is to deter wrongdoing writ large. The
suits act as "fire alarms" for the international system and put the
international system on notice that these types of activities will
not be tolerated and will be "put out." Since international "police
patrols," or invasions, are difficult, costly, and dangerous, these
suits or "fire alarms" are more modest, less dangerous, and can be
more effective."8 It is a way to enforce international norms without having the American state place its treasure and blood at
risk. This approach allows students of international relations and
law to work with federal judges to be the gatekeepers.
As reflected in the discussion, the underlying cause of action
and the substantive issues of law are critical for the debate on
class actions. To this bubbling cauldron of issues, we now add the
situation where the cause of action involves an international
class concerning human rights.
III. PRIVATE RIGHTS PROTECTED OR ASPIRATION OVER REALITY?
International human rights class actions bring together the
two unique worlds of the U.S. approach to international law and
the U.S. procedure of class actions. As one sympathetic commentator has observed, since human rights abuses are often committed on a widespread and systematic basis, and international law
norms prohibit collective remedies, one would think "at first
glance" that class actions would "provide a good fit for human
rights litigation."79 But, as one might expect given the analysis so
7'Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, CongressionalOversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols vs. FireAlarms, in Congress: Structure and Policy, Mathew D. McCubbins

and Terry Sullivan, eds (Cambridge 1987).
" Van Schaack, 2003 U Chi Legal F at 279-80 (cited in note 8).
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far, the tensions of the two worlds have produced similar tensions
in the 23/ATCAITVPA model. In fact, there are the same pro,
anti, and ambivalent positions, based on analogous analytical
grounds supplemented by additional international concerns.
Elsewhere in this Volume, Beth Van Schaack takes the ambivalent position on the 23/ATCATrVPA model and argues, in a manner similar to Epstein, that the model may be especially suited
for particular conditions: where the issues raised in the litigation
concern the doctrine of command responsibility by subordinates,
and in historic
where a corporate course of conduct is in dispute,
80
("WWII").
II
War
World
from
injustice
of
cases
In a fundamental sense, the issue of the intersection of international law and domestic courts was broached once the U.S.
courts upheld the ATCA to provide federal jurisdiction over international violations in 1980.81 In Van Schaack's view, the ATCA
and the TVPA were clear statements by Congress rejecting the
view that international law violations do not enjoy U.S. domestic
jurisdiction. 2 Once the underlying substantive law established
the cause of action, given the ingenuity of American litigation, it
was only a matter of time before a human rights class action
would be filed and upheld, as it was in 1996 in Hilao v Estate of
FerdinandMarcos. 3
When one looks closely at the cases that make the best argument for the model, however, a rather bleak picture emerges.
In the command responsibility and corporate course of conduct
cases, as analyzed by Van Schaack, what is gained pragmatically
is unclear. In Van Schaack's thorough description of Hilao, during the enforcement of the judgment phase, after the U.S. court
had awarded damages for $1.2 billion, a struggle over the Swiss
bank accounts ensued among the Philippine government, the
Marcos heirs, and the class action plaintiffs.84 Since each party
claimed a right to the funds, the Swiss court, when it eventually
transferred the bank funds to the Philippine authorities, did so
with instructions that the rights of the class action plaintiffs be
respected. To date the Philippine courts have refused to comply.

Id at 281.
Filartigav Pefia-Irala,630 F2d 876, 887 (2d Cir 1980).
82 The passage of the TVPA specifically rejected Judge Bork's opinion in Tel Oren v
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F2d 774 (DC Cir 1984); See Van Schaack, 2003 U Chi Legal F
at 281 (cited in note 8).
103 F3d 767 (9th Cir 1996).

Id at 771.
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In the Doe v Karadzic cases," ultimately a limited fund Rule
23(b)(1) class, massive judgments have yet to be collected, although Karadzic was found liable for genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity in both his private capacity and in his
capacity as a state actor. The default judgment was predetermined once Karadzic stipulated that he did not have the financial
resources to bring witnesses for his defense.
These command responsibility cases highlight the fundamental international problem of human rights class action. The host
countries, and the people of the host countries, believe that if
there are financial resources for compensation, the settlement
plan should be controlled by the sovereign state and sovereign
people where the original violations took place. To do otherwise is
to export American procedure and American interpretation of the
substantive law to the third-party countries. Either the host
country's courts or legislatures are the place where the remedy
should be pursued, or the remedy should be determined in an
agreed upon international forum.
On the other hand, there are examples of potential success.
The corporate cases, such as Aguinda v Texaco86 and Ashanga v
Texaco,87 are based on large-scale environmental abuses (for example, toxic spills and harmful hazardous waste disposal) stemming from petroleum operations involving tens of thousands of
individuals and acres of property spoilage. These cases, in a
sense, have been more successful, since the eventual dismissals of
the cases required Texaco to consent to the jurisdiction of the
host countries. But for the filing, however, Texaco would never
have been in a situation to consent to jurisdiction. A traditional
summary judgment would not have involved any consent issues.
In the end, the appellate court's approach of granting a dismissal
on forum non conveniens grounds only if consent to jurisdiction
were granted was a form of international judicial hardball.88
The corporate case that is of a different nature is Doe v Unocal," since it sought injunctive and declaratory relief as a Rule
23(b)(2) class action. The plaintiffs requested that Unocal stop its
joint venture on an oil and gas pipeline with the government of
Burma because of a violent and intimidating Burmese relocation
176 FRD 458 (S D NY 1997); 866 F Supp 734 (S D NY 1994).
850 F Supp 282 (S D NY 1994) (involving Ecuador).
8' 142 F Supp 2d 534 (S D NY 1994) (involving Peru).
Aguinda, 303 F3d 470 (2002).
"
248 F3d 915 (9th Cir 2002).
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program, which included the enslaving of plaintiffs and the
unlawful confiscation of property. What makes the case intriguing is that it is an ongoing abuse and the goal of the litigation is
to enjoin the behavior. There will be no financial boon to the lawyers of the plaintiffs.
In the corporate cases, by requiring the corporate defendants
to submit to the jurisdiction of the host countries when the cases
are dismissed, the plaintiffs use the leverage of the U.S. courts to
force the defendants to deal with issues that they otherwise
would not have to deal with. The natural question that arises is,
given the fact the corporations are doing business in the host
countries, why are the plaintiffs, who are from the host countries,
not bringing the cases in the host countries to begin with? What
will make the host legal system perform?
Another category of cases that has generated interest stems
from conflicts regarding war. The WWII historic justice cases involving dormant survivor Swiss bank accounts, German industrial slave labor abuses, and Korean "comfort women" exploited
by the Japanese are cases of financial remedies to seek a moral
reckoning for horrible acts of torture, slave labor, and human
degradation." In these cases the lawyers can waive any attorneys'
fees for a fixed cap, as in the dormant survivor Swiss bank accounts class, so that claims of attorney-defendant collusion can be
eliminated. These cases are of a special historic nature and involve defined groups who seek an institutional apology by either
collaborative industrial and financial actors or subsequent state
actors.
The strands of American exceptionalists, human rightists,
and legalists come together in command responsibility, corporate,
and historic justice cases to push America's version of international law into the international system. Ironically, the pragmatist strand is left hanging in many of the command responsibility
and corporate cases, since the power of enforcement increasingly
becomes flaccid unless there is host country support. For a pragmatist there is traction in a Rule 23(b)(2) injunction against a
corporate defendant over which the court has clear jurisdiction,
such as in Unocal. Here plaintiffs are like shareholders asking for
an indivisible good-stop the bad acts-to which, based on U.S.
jurisdiction, defendants will have to comply. This is a twist on the
view provided by Epstein and his plaintiff/shareholder compari' Daniel Goldhagan, A Moral Reckoning (Knopf 2002).
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sons, whereby the plaintiffs, or a "rump" of shareholders, are able
to police the actions of the corporation for a public good that the
directors and other shareholders have ignored.
In the historic justice cases, for the pragmatist, there is a
fear that other countries may find the 23/ATCA/TVPA model so
attractive that they might enact a similar model. Imagine a Canadian law, based on the Canadian Bill of Rights, similar to the
23/ATCA/TVPA model. Then imagine the filing of a class action
for slave reparations by the "African-American Descendants of
Slavery" based on the historic case of U.S. slavery and abuse. Finally imagine a remedy by which U.S. bank accounts of U.S. cor9
porations held in Canada are frozen for recovery. If effective,
why shouldn't the popularity of the 23/ATCA/TVPA model spawn
a race to court by other countries? As reflected in the Japanese
forced labor cases, such actions raise treaty and foreign policy
92
considerations that courts find deeply disturbing. For pragmatists, such a rush to domestic court houses for international class
actions would be a legal nightmare.
As Van Schaack's discussion recognizes, the international
remedy has not been particularly effective. Since enforcement is
hard (as in the command cases) none of the corporate cases has
proceeded past class certification, and the historic justice cases
93
have succeeded only with diplomatic involvement. Nevertheless,
the human rights class action has advantages that combine the
international strands of foreign policy with the power of class ac94
tions to produce a right to "truth" or a "moral equilibrium." This
"truth" remedy goes beyond compensation and is part of the declaratory relief that supports the creation and supplementation of
international norms. The cases where the relief sought is injunc" A committee of lawyers has formed the Reparations Assessment Group to pursue
the case in the United States. The committee includes a number of experienced plaintiffs'
attorneys such as Charles J. Ogletree, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School; Johnnie
Cochran and Alexander J. Pires Jr., who won a one billion dollar settlement for black
farmers who claimed discrimination by the U.S. Department of Agriculture; Richard
Scruggs, who won the $368.5 billion settlement for states against tobacco companies;
Dennis C. Sweet III, who won a four hundred million dollar settlement in the "phen-fen!"
diet drug case; and Willie E. Gary, who won a five hundred million dollars judgment
against the Loewen Group Inc, the world's largest funeral home operators. The model for
the U.S. suits comes from the WWII Japanese-American internment and the Nazi-era
slave cases. See Group To Seek Slavery Reparations, Wash Post All (Nov 5, 2000) (describing suit).
' In re World War II Era JapaneseForced Labor Litigation, 164 F Supp 2d 1160 (N D
Cal 2001).
Van Schaack, 2003 U Chi Legal F at 292-305 (cited in note 8).
Id at 313-14.
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tive obviously have more effect on immediate harms. The compensation component often can be more symbolic than real, except in cases where funds have been absconded or government
legislation is triggered by the case, and then significant funds are
involved.
The strongest arguments for international human rights
class actions emphasize the "international institutional failure"
logic. Similar to the market failure logic of supporters of domestic
class actions, the cases not only empower plaintiffs, who, but for
the class mechanism, would be barred from achieving redress,
but also benefit the functioning of the international system and
help enforce responsible corporate behavior. The advantages are
most similar to the Rosenberg position on class action theory:
universal relief and a basis for negotiations. As Van Schaack elegantly describes, these cases can be the foundation for a new level
of international rights recognition through the use of U.S. courts.
Local laws of the host countries over jurisdiction, local politics,
and resource limitations combine to make the 23/ATCA/TVPA
model the only viable alternative. Significantly, minority groups
who otherwise could not benefit from the international Genocide
Conventions, through the use of the class action procedure, can
generate a shared identity based on ethnic and cultural characteristics.95
Needless to say, Van Schaack's argument has a powerful appeal given the failure of the international system. The
23/ATCAfTVPA model gives voice to the voiceless. The forgotten
weak and injured of the world finally have a mechanism to pursue justice. International bad actors are brought to light, some
are forced to stop, some are forced to pay, and some are forced to
confront their own evil. Clearly the three strands of American
international law have come together-exceptionalists, legalists,
human rightists-and crafted an effective tool of international
justice. Why, then, is the world not applauding? Yes, there have
been some problems in enforcing human rights class actions, as
predicted by the pragmatists, but is not the principle sound? Part
of the answer is contained in Van Schaack's discussion on the
disadvantages of using the class action procedure in the human
rights international context.

" Id at 284-305 (analyzing international law claims and forms of responsibility).
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IV. IF THE UNITED STATES TALKS THE TALK, CAN IT THEN CHOOSE
WHEN TO WALK THE WALK?

In the international context of class actions, what must be
added to Epstein's fundamental question of "who holds the cause
of action for damages" is "where should the question be decided?"
When Van Schaack turns to the disadvantages of using the class
action procedure in the international human rights context, the
analysis focuses on the procedural aspects of class actions. As one
would expect from the previous discussion on the theory of class
action, the basic quandary of collective action versus individual
autonomy predominates. The obvious "harm problems" for certification, plaintiff counsel collusion, coerced settlements, and fair
compensations plans are all raised, and viable fixes are proffered.
The Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequate representation, and predominance of
common law and fact are all discussed as hurdles to overcome.
But the critical issue for international human rights class
actions is the question under Rule 23(b)(3) as to whether this proceeding is superior to other forms of adjudication. Given the international context, where else could the case go forward? Under
the four-factor test of Rule 23(b)(3)-the individual interest test,
the other litigation test, the choice of a single forum test, and the
difficulty of management test-what is clear is that, but for the
U.S. forum, there probably would be no litigation. U.S. courts are
the courts that certify "international classes" with elaborate transitional notice schemes, possess broad equitable powers, and have
the power to be creative. Ironically, the success of class certification may allow some states to avoid accountability by denying
"non-judicial redress and reparations to human rights victims."
The state or corporate entity, in fighting the case, has few
choices. The defendant can either be forced to assent to jurisdiction in its own state, propose a political compromise through a
legislative remedy such as a "truth and reconciliation commission," view the class as a competitor to redress, fight the class
certification, or default.
But the critical point, and the one that should give us pause,
is that the international defendant is hauled into a U.S. court by
a U.S. procedure enforcing either U.S. law or U.S. interpretation
of international law, though the international defendant often
has little direct connection to the United States. This is not to say
that the defendants are not bad actors, but when did the United
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States become the center of a global legal order with worldwide
jurisdiction, at the expense of the other international institutions
of justice?96 For instance, this approach begins to establish a notion of "universal jurisdiction" as applied by the U.S. courts and
not by an international body.97 Though there are processes to
serve foreign powers, once a class is certified, American procedures of broad and liberal discovery ensue." As mentioned, courts
can, and have, used judicial techniques that allow for denial of
jurisdiction under the concepts of "minimum contacts," "political
question," or "forum non conveniens," but one must not forget, the
U.S. interpretation of these legal concepts will prevail."9 Moreover, even "forum non conveniens" can be a sword if, as part of the
order of dismissal, there is an agreement to submit to jurisdiction
in another forum. In the pure class action context, even Epstein
approved of such a use in some situations, particularly when
sound substantive claims would be denied access without amalgamation. Yet he worried about its mischievous, corrosive effect
on substantive law. The action was merely an "amplifier for the
ordinary principles of civil litigation" or "a giant megaphone that
amplifies both the strengths and weaknesses of the underlying
system of substantive and procedure."' °
The "giant megaphone" resonates not just through the domestic legal system; it also has international and transnational
affects and ramifications. The 23/ATCA/TVPA model is a potential "world megaphone." It takes the Rosenberg model of private
adjudication for public good to a world extension. Just as Redish
understood class actions as undermining democratic principles,
we can similarly understand the 23/ATCA/TVPA model as creating "world bounty hunters," forcing U.S. private liability compen" Two critics cynically suggest that part of the support for the movement is as an
employment opportunity plan for U.S. LLM foreign graduates, since American training
will be needed to combat the cases. See Mattei and Lena, United States Jurisdiction 13
(cited in note 27).
" See Jack Goldstene and Stephen D. Krasner, The Limits of Idealism 47, 48-53
(Daedalus 2003) (arguing against the Princeton Principles that stand for allowing national
jurisdiction-even if national legislatures are opposed to it-and stripping all potential
defendants of sovereign immunity).
' Under Article 13 of the Hague Evidence Convention, signatories can avoid cooperating with the unique and unpopular American approach to discovery. Mattei and Lena,
United States Jurisdiction8 (cited in note 27). See also Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of
1976, 28 USC § 1602 et seq (2000) for codified limits on discovery and letters rogatory and
other method of service.
Mattei and Lena, United States Jurisdiction(cited in note 27).
Epstein, Class Actions 15-16 (cited in note 35).
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sation schemes on the world in the name of human rights and
international legitimacy.
What makes this Janus-like is that on the international
stage, at the same time U.S. courts are asserting a world jurisdiction amplified by class actions for justice and humanitarian
rights, the U.S. government is rejecting the creation of the ICC.
In a Realist exercise of pragmatic power, the U.S. has rejected a
regime that would hold strong and weak states equally accountable."' Powerful states have been reluctant to delegate authority
to an independent body. In 1999, when the United States signed
the Rome Statute that created the ICC, the United States expressed general reservations on a number of points that can be
summarized as follows: (1) opposition to universal jurisdiction of
any state whether a signatory to the statute or not; °2 (2) opposition to the term "crime of aggression" without a clear definition,
since use of nuclear weapons may be included under the current
definition; (3) opposition to the power of the prosecutor to investigate actions without a specific complaint and to the request for
single member Security Council veto power; 1 3 and 4) opposition
to U.S. military personnel being subject to ICC jurisdiction for
any official military action.
When one contrasts U.S. reservations to the ICC with U.S.
projection of the 23/ATCA/TVPA model for human rights, many of
the world criticisms of the 23/ATCA/TVPA model mirror the U.S.
reservations. Who has the legitimacy to define terms? How can
jurisdiction be asserted without consent? And, how can an action
go forward without any restriction on the general parameters of
the cause of action? These are international treaty power questions, yet under the 23/ATCA/TVPA model, judges and private
parties will be establishing public international rules without
international public power supervision. How does the United
States simultaneously project such international engagement and
rejection? The answer is based on the prominence of the rights
and legalism strands as embodied in the 23/ATCA/TVPA model
"° Christopher Rudolph, Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Tribunals, 55 International Organization 3, 655-91 (Summer 2001). The following discussion
draws from Rudolph's analysis.
102 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art 4(2), available online at
http://www.un.org/law/icclstatute/romefra.htm (visited Oct 9, 2003).
Id at Art 13(c), 15(1). The United States is a permanent member of the Security
Council along with four other permanent members: France, the Russia Federation, the
United Kingdom, and China. There are fifteen members in the Security Council and the
other ten countries are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms.
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and contrasted with the dominance of the exceptionalist and
pragmatist strands in the ICC case. As is often the case in U.S.
politics, different branches of government act at cross purposes
based on different jurisdictions. How can this paradigm of "international jurisdiction Janusism" be resolved?
For Realists in the international realm, power is asymmetric,
and the debate over the 23/ATCA/TVPA model turns on how well
the model advances the interests of the United States. Interests
usually are defined narrowly as the projection of American power,
the protection of American territory at home, and the protection
of American interests abroad. Exceptionalists and pragmatists
are Realists who sometimes differ on courses of action but agree
that the goal of American policy is to pursue America's interests.
Realists value the projection of American power, and they usually
only recognize forms of power in the military and economic
spheres and reject outside limitations on the uses of such instruments. In other words, law is employed only when useful. Like
the Athenian frame of mind, as expressed in The Melian Dialogue
in Thucydides's The PeloponnesianWar, power is the only criteria
to evaluate action-the strong do what they will, the weak suffer
what they must.04 Exceptionalists contend the 23/ATCAiTVPA
model is appropriate since it is an American model and pragmatists fear the possible backlash of other countries pursuing a
similar model and suing Americans.
Idealists, like human rightists and legalists, struggle to transcend Realist power politics and place international relations on a
new foundation, emphasizing the rational approach to statecentered institutions supporting international regimes of cooperation. The League of Nations after World War I and the reconstituted Security Council of the United Nations and European
Union all embody, as institutional goals, these objectives." 5 Although human rightists applaud how the 23/ATCA/TVPA model
advances human rights, the legalist strain decries the erosion
and displacement of international legal institutions.
Ironically, Realism explains a great deal about international
relations today but proponents undervalue the role that international regimes and organizations play in creating a perceived le" Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, The Melian Dialogue, Book 5, Chapter 17
(Oxford 1835).
" Lisa Martin, An Institutionalist View: International Institutions and State
Strategies, Conference on International Order in the 21st Century 1-2, available online at
<httpJ/www.people.fas.harvard.edu/-llmartin/biblio.html> (visited Oct 9, 2003).
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gitimate world order for weaker states. Idealism, while at least
acknowledging the existence of international regimes and organizations, tends to overvalue the power of international institutions
to be effective and fair. In short, Realism recognizes no rules
while Idealism assumes any rule will be enforceable.
The 23/ATCA/TVPA model falls between these schools and
raises the notion of the creation of the neo-institutionalist concept."°6 Neo-institutionalists, on the one hand, acknowledge that
international institutions can play a key role in international affairs but, on the other, do not claim that international institutions are automatically powerful, and instead place great emphasis on ascertaining when they can, and will, be effective. One central point, from the neo-institutionalists' perspective, is whether
the judgments of the 23/ATCA/TVPA suits carry any real force.
Thus far, of the three types of suits-corporate, historic, and human rights-it appears that only the corporate suits have had
success in attempting to persuade local jurisdictions to accept the
causes of action. On the question of effectiveness, therefore, neoinstitutionalists argue that only some rules (for example, institutions) can have force, because only those properly designed can
induce cooperation that make self-interested improvements to the
positions of the state actors. So, once properly put in place, they
are virtually self-enforcing.
Joseph Nye, an internationalist theorist, has described
American Influence by dividing power into hard and soft categories."7 Hard power is exercised through economic sanctions and
military force. 08 Soft power involves the ability to influence action
through the institutionalization of the values of liberty, human
rights, and democracy.' 9 Soft power is exercised through U.S.
universities, cultural exports, domestic life, and international
organizations."0 Additionally, "soft power.

. .works through in-

ternational organizations like the International Monetary Fund,
NATO or the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. To the
See, for example, Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons, Theories and Empirical Studies
of InternationalInstitutions, 50 International Organizations 4, 729-57, (1998); Robert 0.
Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy
(Princeton University Press 1984); Joseph S. Nye, Jr. The Power We Must Not Squander,
NY Times A19, (Jan 3, 2000). See also Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox ofAmerican Power:
Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone (Oxford 2002).
"07See Nye, The Power, NY Times at A19 (cited in note 106).
1w Id.
109Id.
110Id.
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extent that they shape the agenda of choices for other countries
in ways that are compatible with our interests, they enhance our
soft power.""' To institutionalize the idea of soft power within
international institutions, it may be more effective to engage international tribunals that then apply pressure on states and corporations, rather than to use domestic judicial structures and
class actions. If the great powers allow the "international community" and its institutions to stand on the sidelines as the
"harms" continue, the morality of the system will be called into
question.' Having only one state actor, or having only one state's
courts be the sole forum for redress, will breed deep resentment
no matter how well-intentioned.
Recent history has generated international tribunal experiences in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Cambodia, and East Timor.
The creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
has set a precedent for procedures and law in such tribunals. By
having the chief prosecutor for Yugoslavia serve as the chief
prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
and having both tribunals share appeals chambers, consistency
will be encouraged. Moreover, jurisdictionally the ICTY court
ruled that Article 3 of the Geneva Convention applies to war
crimes whether or not individuals are from different countries,
reasoning that "the distinction between interstate wars and civil
wars (intrastate) is losing its value as far as human beings are
concerned."11 Article 15, Rule 61 of the ICTY Statute allows for a
"super-indictment," by which an indictment in open court can
be
submitted without the defendant present for cross-examination of
witnesses. 3 These rules are the nascent forms of the creation of
an international norm for international tribunal adjudication.
U.S. support and expansion of this international norm would
go far in beginning an international tribunal regime because this
norm raises the national sovereignty issue and the Weberian
question of force. How international tribunals interact with domestic courts of the country where the causes of action have
arisen is the test for the fairness of the process. For example,

. Nye, The Power, NY Times at A19 (cited in note 106).
.' Prosecutor v Tadic, IT-94-1-AR72 (1995), available online at <http://www.un.org/
icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/tad-aj990715e.pdf> (visited Oct 10, 2003).
"" Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Art 51,
Rule 16, available online at <http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm> (visited Oct 10,
2003).
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holding the Rwanda tribunal in Tanzania does not integrate the
legal process with the internal domestic politics of Rwanda. Creating "mixed tribunals" of Cambodians and international judges
proved to be an effective innovation of including domestic
forces." 4 While in East Timor, the objections of the Indonesian
government to the U.N. Commission for Human Rights neutralized the tribunal and emphasized the need of great power cooperation."' If the United States begins to support the international
tribunal regime over international human rights class actions,
the power of the international system will be strengthened.
Therefore, the issue still remains whether the 23/ATCA/TVPA
model is an approach that serves U.S. interests and is desirable.
As the United States continues to prosecute the Global War on
Terrorism, institutions, regimes, and accords that promote cooperation and international justice will be critical for success. Is the
23/ATCAITVPA model mechanism an appropriate use of U.S.
"soft power"? Or, from the neo-institutionalist perspective, is it
effective if it is not enforceable, or, if enforced, will it be counterproductive? Under what conditions would the 23/ATCA/TVPA
model be most effective? Thus far the model has not enjoyed critical success. Do we as a nation support the concept of having private American lawyers spearheading efforts for the public and
international compensation of foreign torts as the mechanism to
creating a more just world? Is it a wise foreign policy to let the
private market of lawyers be the arbiter of which cases to prosecute?
Paradoxically, the argument for a more aggressive system of
international adjudication and accountability also supports early
multilateral military intervention. With military intervention
there will be "civilian" casualties that may generate offenses under an international law of war crimes. Part of this paradox is
why the United States is reluctant to join the ICC. Another part
of this paradox is why the United States supports the
23/ATCA/TVPA model. One forum is a U.S. controlled forum; the
other is not. But the recent experience with "tribunal regimes"
has demonstrated that coordinating with these domestic national
courts builds legitimacy. Ideally, American engagement in international institutions that pursue multilateral approaches to domestic violations and harms is the preferred method of promoting
.. Note that it was the failure of having timely trials that undermined the effectiveness of the process.
' Rudolph, 55 Int Org at 677 (cited in note 101).
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collective human rights. Exporting a private model such as the
23/ATCA/TVPA model, although well intentioned, is a crude
method in the international community and may be viewed as too
hypocritical a use of soft power.
To paraphrase Mark Twain, we should "tell others to do
good" but we should also take the "trouble" to do good as members of international institutions, not solely as Americans. The
price of failure is high. One commentator, noting how difficult
reconciliation would be in Cambodia (since to pursue justice
would be to indict the whole community) likened the pursuit of
justice to trying to pick up a rusty chain that bloodies anyone who
touches it."6 Not touching the chain permits the liable and guilty
to remain free. Touching the chain alone will mean not sharing
the bleeding.
The entire international community is required to ensure
justice, since the responsibility lies with the entire international
community. The final dilemma remains: what is the most effective path to the institution or regime of international justice? For
some thinkers "modern politics," particularly for America, is the
business of structuring power." 7 The 23/ATCAflVPA model must
be supported only if it adds to the positive structuring of power in
the international context. To create such a domestic forum for
international adjudication, while at the same time refusing to
recognize or support international fora that would hold American
citizens similarly accountable, would be to hold up one face to the
world and another to ourselves.

"'
17

Id at 676.
Jedediah Purdy, Being American 272 (Knopf 2003).

